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Foreign Rule? Transnational, national, and local perspectives on Venice and Venetia 
within the ʻmultinationalʼ empire
The so-called seconda dominazione austriaca of Venice and Venetia lasted from 1814 to 1866, 
punctuated only  by the revolutionary parenthesis of 1848–9. This half century of rule from Vienna 
has traditionally been seen as a period of exploitative and insensitive government backed by  heavy-
handed policing, restrictive censorship, and ultimately  dependent on the presence of regiments of 
white-coated Croat and Austrian troops. Such a leggenda nera of Habsburg tyranny has been 
challenged for some decades (Berengo, 1971), but there has persisted a tendency  to view the rule of 
Francis I, Ferdinand, and Francis Joseph as a sombre and unhappy interlude between the fall of the 
Serenissima and the incorporation of Venice and its Terraferma within the newly  united Italian 
state. More than thirty  years ago Paul Ginsborg told us in his brilliant study of Daniele Manin that 
‘the principles and requirements of the Austrians were in contradiction to the needs and aspirations 
of nearly every section of Venetian society’ (Ginsborg, 1979, 2); the failure to make significant 
changes in his recent Italian re-edition of the book demonstrates that he still believes there is no 
reason to alter this judgment (Ginsborg, 2007). Meanwhile, the Habsburgs’ acquisition of Venice 
remains for one respected British historian no more than ‘a mercenary transfer’ (Evans, 2009, 124). 
A more balanced view of Austrian rule has emerged in the specialist  historiography (Zorzi, 1985; 
Meriggi, 1983 & 1987; Mazohl-Wallnig, 1993; Laven, 1996 & 2002; Tonetti, 1997; Gottsman, 
2005), but less scholarly  works (eg Keates, 2005), as well as representations in popular culture have 
continued to portray the Habsburg presence in Italy as unwelcome and alien: at best the Austrians 
are the moustachioed whitecoats of Giuseppe Giusti’s Sant’Ambrogio; at worst they are little better 
than precursors of Nazi occupation of 1943–5.1  Underpinning this durably negative picture of 
Austrian rule has been the tendency to explain Venetian and Lombard unhappiness with Habsburg 
dominion in terms of the fundamentally ‘foreign’ and ‘German’ nature of the régime and its 
machinery  of government. The problem with Austrian rule is presented in terms of one nation’s 
dominion over another.
 It is, of course, a commonplace to write of the Austrian Empire as a ‘multinational 
empire’ (eg Taylor, 1948; Kann, 1950 & 1964; Macartney, 1969; Béranger, 1990 & 1994). Whether 
this apparently  obvious fact constituted the key  virtue or the fundamental shortcoming of the 
imperial project has been the central debate within the historiography of the Habsburg monarchy 
since before its fall. In their preoccupation with this question, twentieth- and twenty-first-century 
historians have often echoed earlier scholars and thinkers, bureaucrats and polemicists. Yet among 
those nineteenth-century authors who identified major benefits both in the existence of the 
Habsburg empire and in its multinational character are a number of surprising names. For example, 
in the years before the mid-century  revolutions, the Milanese economist Carlo Cattaneo, who 
briefly and bravely assumed the leadership of the Milanese insurrection during the cinque giornate, 
argued that the Habsburg Empire should transform into a federation of autonomous states linked by 
loyalty to the ruling house (Armani, 1997; Thom, 1999 & 2000). Similarly the Bohemian historian 
František Palacký, usually portrayed as the Otec národa – the father of the Czech nation – argued 
presciently  in his famous rebuff to the Frankfurt Parliament in April 1848 that the Austrian 
monarchy was necessary to defend the host of smaller nations of which it  consisted from both 
German and Russian aggression: even bringing the component nationalities of the monarchy 
together as a confederation of small republics would be no more than an open invitation to the tsar 
1 See, for example, films such as Le cinque giornate (Dario Argento, 1973), Le hussard sur le toit (Jean-Paul 
Rappeneau, 1995), Le cinque giornate di Milano (Carlo Lizzani, 2004).
to expand at their expense (Palacký, 1948). The Hungarian Adolph Fischhof was imprisoned for his 
pivotal rôle in the akademische Legion during the Viennese revolution of 1848, but this did not 
prevent his becoming a stalwart advocate of Habsburg rule: the monarchy, he hoped, would 
eventually rule a vast Nationalitätenstaat, a sort of central European, dynastic Switzerland 
(Fischhof, 1866, 1868, 1885 & 1888). That at different times the empire could be defended by these 
men, all three of whom played an important rôle in the anti-Habsburg revolutions of 1848, 
demonstrates the degree to which even those instinctively  uncomfortable with or opposed to 
Habsburg imperial domination were frequently able to recognise the benefits to be derived by its 
component parts from rule by the House of Austria. Many others, often numbering among the most 
committed defenders of the dynasty’s power were a good deal less tolerant of such diversity. 
Figures such as the talented young official Baron Karl Friedrich Kübeck von Kübau who drafted the 
initial proposals for the reincorporation of Lombardy and Venetia into the Austrian Empire, or 
Prince Prokop Lažansky who presided over the commision appointed to oversee this task shared a 
desire to impose policies of centralisation and uniformity wherever and whenever local conditions 
permitted (Laven, 2002, 64–6; Meriggi, 1983, 54–5).2  Similarly  the likes of Carl Czoernig and 
Bernhard Meyer saw the empire’s best hope of survival and success in greater centralisation and 
homogenity (Evans, 2009, 129; Meyer, 1857; Czoernig, 1858), believing such a strategy was 
needed to fend off the threat of separatism, to keep possible tensions between the nationalities in 
check, and, increasingly as the nineteenth century progressed, to stave off irredentist claims from 
nationalists without the imperial frontiers. Meanwhile, contemporary critics of the Austrian 
imperium – both Habsburg subjects and foreign – berated the empire from one of two basic 
perspectives. On the one hand, attacks focused on the alleged repression of diverse national rights, 
traditions, customs, and languages, the failure either to grant autonomy and privileges, or to permit 
secession and independence; on the other hand, they  emphasised the failure of emperors to impose 
greater uniformity, to deal more firmly with all or some of the different nationalities. 
 It is tempting for historians to echo the positions of the better-known nineteenth-century 
commentators on the Nationalitätenfrage and to privilege the many ‘nations’ of the Habsburg lands 
in their narratives and analyses. In so doing do we risk missing key parts of the story  or otherwise 
distorting the picture? One danger with approaches that privilege so-called ‘nationalities’ is that 
they  give a primacy to imagined communities that were probably only  rarely  or intermittently the 
primary focus of attachment or identity  for much of the population. Within the Habsburg Empire 
there were many other potential poles that both transcended the national – one thinks automatically 
of adherence to the Catholic Church – or threatened to subvert or fragment it through, for example, 
the strength of historical, linguistic, and cultural identities or economically determined interests that 
operated at a municipal, local, or regional level. An emphasis on nationalities as fundamentally 
problematic, as dangers to the imperial project, also runs the risk of presenting the national as 
necessarily inimical to the multinational, dynastic Habsburg state, when it could serve as a potential 
buttress for the imperial project. In this article we want both to question the emphasis on the 
‘national’ as the obvious subdivision of empire, and to ask how it could be used as a prop for the 
empire. We shall do so by looking at a number of case studies to suggest different ways to 
understand the relationship  between Venice and Vienna during the seconda dominazione. We 
approach these case studies not by looking at Habsburg rule principally  in terms of national 
domination of Austrian over Italian; instead we aim to locate Venetians within a transnational 
cultural space, and to highlight the extent to which the local, municipal, regional, and national could 
all work for as well as against the empire.
2 Arthur G. Haas’s interpretation of the commission’s work is grossly misleading. (Haas, 1963).
The Regno Lombardo-Veneto: What’s in a name?
The key debates that accompanied the re-incorporation of Lombardy and Venetia into the lands of 
the Habsburg Empire focused overwhelmingly  on administrative structures and personnel, 
questions about the standardisation of law codes, the reorganisation of policing and censorship, 
changes to conscription and the fisc. But the officials tasked with overseeing the more-or-less 
smooth transition of these provinces back to rule from Vienna were also much exercised by what 
exactly  to call the territories that had been recaptured from Napoleon. Never before had the 
Habsburgs ruled the lands on both sides of the River Mincio: when, following Campo Formio, 
Francis II had relinquished his Lombard possessions and assumed control of Venetia, the lands that 
fell to him were referred to as the ‘Provincie Austro-Venete’ (Gottardi, 1993). Having repossessed 
all the Lombard and Venetian lands, not to mention those areas that, prior to 1796–7, had been part 
of Venetian Lombardy – the so-called al di là del Mincio – and which had never previously 
experienced Austrian control, it made sense to incorporate all these provinces into a single territorial 
bloc within the Empire. This was not just to facilitate the smooth transition of territory and 
population from the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy  to Habsburg rule, but also to avoid offering an 
excuse for the eruption of longstanding local antagonisms. 
 In the Vorschläge he produced in December 1814 as the basis for discussing the treatment of 
the reacquired north Italian provinces, Kübeck proposed that the lands should be called ‘Ost- und 
West-Italien’. His rationale for such a name was that it would ‘kill off the idea of the independence 
of numerous provinces and small states’, undermining particularist campanilismo and creating a 
common sense of identity within the Kingdom, while simultaneously easing the assimilation of the 
Italian lands into the wider structures of the Austrian Empire (Helfert, 1908, 285). ‘East- and West-
Italy’ was a deliberate attempt to stress the common italianità of the region, at the expense of the 
more deeply engrained historical identities of lombardi and veneti, of milanesi and veneziani, 
emphasising that the local population shared a common civilisation, culture, and language. But 
would such a name have any resonance for any of the inhabitants of the region? The members of 
the Central-Organisirungs-Hof-Commission entrusted with the reorganisation of the provinces 
seized from Napoleon seem to have agreed that it would not. The COHC toyed with the idea of 
‘Regno Longobardo’ – proposed by the Aulic Councillor, Joseph Edler Hauer –, which clearly 
sought to echo the ‘Regnum langobardorum’ of the sixth to eighth centuries. But if this possibly 
gave a sense of historical legitimacy to the Kingdom, ‘Lombard Kingdom’ risked offending 
Venetians. The latter not only  did not consider themselves to be Lombards; they were also 
immensely  proud of their ancient ancestors’ resistance to all invaders whether Goth or Frank, 
Lombard or Norman, Hun or Saracen. Moreover, the stress on Lombardy also suggested that the 
new order would continue to recognise the primacy of Milan (capital of Lombardy) over Venice. 
Venetian hostility  to Napoleonic rule had not been based purely on dislike for high taxes and heavy 
conscription, anger at an economic policy that spelled disaster for the port, and unsurprising enmity 
towards the man who had robbed the city of independence and empire. Venetians also particularly 
resented the preferential treatment given to Lombards when it came to making appointments within 
the administration – something that, at least in the short-term, the Habsburgs were inclined to 
continue given the shortage of appropriate Venetian personnel –, and were bitter over the 
humiliating subjection of the former Dominante to control from Milan: under the French, Venice 
had been reduced to no more than capital of the Dipartimento dell’Adriatico, of comparable status 
to Treviso, Belluno or Udine. In deciding on the nomenclature of the new Kingdom, it  was 
important to signal to the Venetians that there would be a clear breach with the previous régime. 
This meant that any idea of calling the Habsburg Italian provinces the ‘Regno d’Italia’, as they had 
been named during the decennio napoleonico, was also completely out of the question. Calling the 
provinces the ‘Kingdom of Italy’ would antagonise anti-Napoleonic sentiment; equally it risked 
fostering hopes among those who looked nostalgically  on the previous régime. And it would be a 
particular insult to Venetians, who had suffered so much under French rule, while Milan – ironically 
given that it was the Milanese who rebelled against the Napoleonic régime – had been had been 
turned into a grand Napoleonic capital city (Helfert, 1901, 206–208; Meriggi, 1987, 17–18).
 In order to smooth the transition to rule from Vienna, Venice had to be given equal status 
with Milan to prevent municipal and regional jealousies. Thus, it became clear that the names of 
both regions had to be included in the name of the Kingdom. Significantly, when the Emperor 
eventually chose the name for the new Kingdom in early  April 1815, he opted for the ‘lombardisch-
venetianische Königreich’ or ‘Regno Lombardo-Veneto’ and not the Kingdom of ‘Lombardy and 
Venetia’. While eager to break with his son-in-law’s legacy, and to recognise the equal status of 
both parts of his Italian territories, he had no desire to emphasise their differences; despite the 
equality  established between Milan and Venice (both had the status of joint  capital), Francis wanted 
to rule Lombardy-Venetia as a single Kingdom (Laven 2002, 84; Helfert, 1901, 206–208; Meriggi, 
1987, 17–18). Strikingly though, what was at stake here was not the question of nationality  and the 
new transnational threats of revolution, liberalism or nationalism, but rather the necessity of 
containing and managing local rivalries and jealousies, both historic and recent.
Foreigners, the Biblioteca italiana, and the uses of Italian culture
On more than one occasion between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of revolution in 1848 
Metternich described Italy as a ‘geographical expression’. Many historians – perhaps most notably 
A.J.P. Taylor – have argued that Metternich’s views on Italy derived from the fact that he considered 
this nationalism as anathema to the multi-national empire: the idea that Italy  should be a merely 
‘geographical expression’ was wishful thinking, a goal rather than a reality: as Taylor famously 
wrote ‘with other opponents the Habsburgs could compromise [...] only Italian nationalism was 
implacable’ (1948, 41). It is not our intention here to point out again the wrongheadedness of 
Taylor’s position, or to highlight the internal contradictions that make the Oxford historian’s 
arguments – polemical brilliance and seductively  elegant prose notwithstanding – completely self-
defeating (Laven, 2002, 78–9). Rather our point is to stress that both Francis I and his minister not 
only had a firm – possibly even exaggerated – belief in the essential cultural homogeneity of the 
Italian peninsula, but that they  were also anxious to cultivate a sense of cultural italianità as a 
useful political tool. 
 Several preliminary points are worth making before looking at the Austrian attempts to 
foster a common Italian culture. First, if, as we have argued above, Austrian rule of Venetia is 
frequently (and mistakenly) described in terms of a ‘foreign’ presence, then Austria itself can be 
seen as controlled by foreigners too. Metternich, born in Koblenz, was a Rhinelander, who spoke 
better French than German; as a young man – like Goethe – he studied at the University of 
Strasbourg, before completing his education at Mainz; Friedrich von Gentz (architect  of the 
Carlsbad decrees and Metternich’s chief adviser) was born in the Prussian city  of Breslau 
(Wrocław) and educated in Berlin and Königsberg. Most significantly, there is an argument to be 
made that Francis I was himself Italian: the son of the Grand Duke of Tuscany  and future emperor, 
Peter Leopold, Francis was born in Florence and did not move to Vienna until 1784, when he was 
sixteen; all Francis’s twelve brothers and sisters were also born in Tuscany. Viewed from this 
perspective, might it  not be plausibly  argued that, rather than Austria’s sinisterly exercising its 
hegemony over Italy  and the German Confederation, an Italian and two non-Austrian Germans 
dominated the empire’s affairs in the early decades of the restoration?
 This is, of course, something of a caricature. There is little evidence that Francis saw himself 
as especially Italian, but equally he would not have assumed the position adopted by Francis Joseph 
in 1859, when he famously rejected Napoleon III’s suggestion of anti-Prussian collaboration with 
‘Doch, Ich bin ein deustcher Fürst’. Francis could conceive of himself as Tuscan, Italian, German, 
Austrian ... but above all else he was dynastic in his worldview. A rhetorical description of him as 
Italian character simply serves to highlight the fundamental problem of trying to view late 
eighteenth- and early  nineteenth-century Europe in terms of nationalities or degrees of 
‘foreignness’. Lombards and Venetians could clearly consider both Francis and Napoleon 
foreigners, oltremontani to use the word that was current in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries 
(Gilbert, 1984; 1965), but given their respective Tuscan and Corsican origins, they were also 
recognisably from the broader cultural and linguistic family of Italians. This did not necessarily 
make them any more popular: for, while historically  loathing for the barbari from beyond the Alps 
was strongest at times of actual invasion, some of the most intense prejudice and dislike was always 
retained for fellow Italians regardless of whether they found themselves at war or peace. In contrast, 
dislike for Napoleon or Francis was not premised on their being foreign, but on their pursuing 
policies that caused resentment. 
 Our second point is that  neither Metternich – who was, at least in cultural terms, profoundly 
italophile – nor Francis I had any  desire to prevent  the cultivation of a common Italian cultural 
identity. This might seem surprising given the patriotic activities of German romantics over the 
previous two decades, which should have constituted a warning of how such a cultural agenda 
could threaten Austrian hegemony. Yet, as we have observed, Metternich was eager to emphasise 
Italian cultural unity and a sense of a collective political destiny  for the peninsula, mobilised in the 
interests of Austria. It was, after all, Metternich who had championed the idea of an Italian 
Confederation to parallel that established in Germany  (Laven, 1997). Thus the Austrian authorities 
determined to establish the Biblioteca italiana as a vehicle for Italian literary, cultural, and scientific 
debate under the auspices of the Habsburg régime. It is well-known that the attempt by Bellegarde 
to woo Ugo Foscolo – who, despite having been born on Zante, and having spent his childhood in 
Venetian Dalmatia, was widely acknowledged as the most talented of all ‘Venetian’ men of letters – 
as the journal’s editor proved abortive: Foscolo slipped into exile rather than take an oath of 
allegience to the Austrian emperor (Haas, 1963, 96; Helfert, 1901, 175). The Biblioteca italiana’s 
editorship fell instead to the astute Giuseppe Acerbi, who made no secret that the journal had been 
established to propound those principles that best matched the interests and goals of the Austrian 
government (Luzio, 1910, 16). Acerbi was certainly careful to exclude overtly  political articles, 
which was scarcely  surprising given the heavy-handed nature of the Habsburg censors operating 
both locally in Lombardy-Venetia and under the Viennese Polizeipräsident, Joseph Count 
Sedlnitzky von Choltic (Laven, 2002, 175–92; Berti, 1989). But while Acerbi eschewed politics, he 
managed – or was perhaps permitted – to perform a careful balancing act, maintaining a fair 
measure of editorial independence without alienating the administration, police, or censors 
(Bizzocchi, 1979). The journal never reached the same literary heights as the short-lived 
Conciliatore of September 1818 to October 1819, of the Florentine Antologia founded in 1820, or 
of the Annali universali di statistica or the Politecnico (which have come to be so closely associated 
with Carlo Cattaneo), but it did play a significant rôle in the cultural life of Venice, the Regno 
Lombardo-Veneto, and the peninsula as a whole. The Biblioteca italiana was a genuinely Italian 
project.
 What is striking to us about the state-sponsored Biblioteca italiana is not so much the 
content of the articles therein, but the way in which Acerbi divided material. Each edition, always 
sporting a woodcut of Petrarch on the frontespiece, essentially contained two main sections (on 
literature and the liberal arts, and on science and the mechanical arts respectively), and two so-
called appendices of extracts and reviews. These latter were split not according to subject matter, 
but according to place of origin: on the one hand, there were ‘Scienze, lettere ed arti straniere’ and, 
on the other hand, there were ‘Scienze, lettere ed arti italiane’. The former might address works 
from France, the United States, Britain, and Austria; the latter included works published not only in 
the Lombardo-Veneto, but also in the Two Sicilies, Tuscany, Sardinia-Piedmont, and the Papal 
States. Italy  may  have been dismissed as a ‘geographical expression’ by Metternich, but to the 
official intellectual mouthpiece of the Habsburgs it was also desirable that  it  should become a 
cultural whole. 
 Within this context it is worth remembering that Venetians were anxious to stress their 
distinctiveness. There was, for example, an extremely lively interest in dialect poetry. In the early 
years of the restoration, Venetian dialect poets, notably Antonio Lamberti, Francesco Gritti, Camillo 
Nalin, and, above all, Pietro Buratti, perhaps best known as author of the Elefanteide (a satirical 
poem that landed him in considerable trouble with the authorities), were both popular and 
influential. Their audience was by no means purely local; it was also recognised internationally: as 
one review of Nalin’s poetry  remarked, ‘[...] lasciamo le lodi di questo dialetto, già da Byron e da 
altri stranieri appellato il più poetico di tutto’ (L’Apatista, 27 Oct. 1834). Indeed, it was quite 
probably  Buratti’s ottava rima that first inspired Byron’s Beppo, and ultimately  his greatest  work, 
Don Juan. The pride in the distinctive nature of Venetian dialect and culture was not, of course, in 
direct opposition to a sense of italianità. As we shall see, such municipal, local, and cultural 
allegiances were not mutually  exclusive. There was no straightforward ideological connection 
between language and a sense of nationhood.
 
 In this sense it  is worth reflecting on two of the great heroes of 1848 in Venice. On the one 
hand, Niccolò Tommaseo, a Dalmatian Italian, was principally famous until he became embroiled in 
the Lotta legale for his rôle as a talented lexicographer, author of the Dizionario dei sinomini della 
lingua italiana. He would later collaborate in the 1850s in the production of a Dizionario della 
lingua italiana (of which numerous editions would appear from different publishing houses for 
decades). Yet as well as being a leading figure in Italian lexicography, and a key  player in the 
Venetian anti-Austrian insurrection of 1848, Tommaseo was also, from at  least 1839, a champion of 
the Slavic national cause and a close collaborator with Stipan Ivičević (Reill, 2012, 142–48); he was 
also profoundly interested in questions concerning the Slav languages of Dalmatia (Bonazza, 2004, 
2008). On the other hand, Daniele Manin, the driving force behind the Venetian revolution 
(Ginsborg, 1979), was also a talented lexicographer, having worked with Giuseppe Boerio on the 
Dizionario del dialetto veneziano (1829). Manin, who in 1848–9 was deeply suspicious of the 
Piedmontese in general and their ruling house in particular, nevertheless, ultimately  proved pivotal 
in legimitating the House of Savoy’s leadership  of the movement for national independence through 
his endorsement of the Società Nazionale Italiana. A taste for dialect did not equate to opposition to 
or for that matter support for the idea of nationhood. 
 Since Dante wrote De vulgari eloquentia in the first lustrum of the fourteenth century, 
debate had raged over whether Italy needed a common tongue. Whether championed by  the 
Venetian Pietro Bembo two hundred years after Dante, or by Alessandro Manzoni in the nineteenth 
century, the demand for a common tongue had had powerful and eloquent supporters, but this did 
not necessarily translate into either nationalism or calls for unity, just as a preference for or taste in 
regional dialect did not preclude a fiercely nationalist  or pro-unification stance. Moreover, a passion 
for local languages could also be part of a wider project: thus when, two years after Venice was lost 
by Austria, Giovanni Domenico Nardo published the text of a paper entitled ‘Considerazioni 
filologiche sull’importalza [sic] dello studio comparativo dei dialetti rustici’, which had been 
delivered at the Ateneo Veneto, his position was not only to take pleasure from and demonstrate 
local pride in Venetian dialects. Nor was his goal simply to study and preserve linguistic curiosities. 
Rather he sought to locate Chioggiotto and Buranello, Padovano and Veneziano within broader 
philological and linguistic debates. In doing this he was consciouly echoing ideas that he traced 
back to eighteenth-century  scholars such as Melchiorre Cesarotti, and even the early philological 
works of the great historian Ludovico Muratori. On the one hand, Nardo intended his work to 
contribute to the understanding of the origins and development not  just  of Italian but also of Indo-
European languages more generally through the study  of ‘i dialetti nazionali’ (Nardo, 1868). On the 
other hand, Nardo wanted to build on the foundations of Manin’s and Boerio’s work to improve still 
further the value of this ‘opera fondamentale’. Working on the dialects of the Venetian lagoon and 
its hinterland was thus an act of scholarship with local, national and transnational resonance.
Celebrating the past: the Panteon Veneto
In 1847 Venice played host to the ninth and final Congress of Italian Scientists. The first  of these 
congresses had taken place in Pisa in 1839, under the relatively tolerant rule of the Archduke 
Leopold II. Thereafter there had been gatherings in Turin (1840), Florence (1841), Padua (1842), 
Lucca (1843), Milan (1844), Naples (1845), and Genoa (1846). In one sense these events were 
openly  pan-Italian – the word ‘nazionale’ was unashamedly and regularly used in describing them – 
but they  also attracted a fair number of non-Italian scholars. When Gottardo Calvi – Genoese-born 
champion of the ‘società di mutuo soccorso’ – wrote an account of the first congress, originally 
published in the Rivista europea, he acknowledged the German inspiration for the meeting, but 
stressed that the aim was to bring ‘i dotti di quasi tutte le parti d’Italia’ together ‘per chiarire alcuni 
dubbi e per proporre nuove ed importanti questioni, il tutto a vantaggio della scienza, dell’Italia, 
dell’umanità’ (Calvi, 1839, 5–6). The idea, so succinctly expressed by Calvi, that  the congresses 
simultaneously  celebrated the city in which they  were held, while equally contributing to the glory 
of Italy and the welfare of humanity  became a standard theme. This was equally true of those 
organised in Italian cities that were also part of the Habsburg empire. For example, at the Milan 
conference, the opening address of Count Vitaliano Borromeo, to an audience that included the 
Austrian Viceroy and the Cardinal Archbishop, began by  acknowledging Lucca, the last  host, before 
expounding on the vitality moral, industrial, and cultural of the Lombard capital. Borromeo 
continued to define the purpose of the congresses as serving ‘all’onore del Nome Italiano e alla 
maggiore utilità universale’ (Diario, 1844, 3).
 As Maria Pia Casalena has pointed out, while the congresses have become ‘a fully-fledged 
myth in the national memory of the Risorgimento’ (2007, 153), it is important not to exaggerate 
their nationalist agenda. Certainly they did on occasion provide arenas for the expression of such 
sentiments, but their agenda was more often national than nationalist. For the organisers and rulers 
who offered patronage to the congresses, as well as local delegates there was also the opportunity to 
vaunt municipal pride within both a national and a pan-European, even global context. Moreover, 
some ostensibly  nationalist actions, such as the distribution at the Genoa congress of 
commemorative medals celebrating the centenary of the ‘Balilla’ rising against  the Austrians, could 
also carry a municipalist or even separatist agenda: the 1746 rebellion may  have been anti-Austrian, 
but it was also against the Piedmontese who were allies of the Austrians at the time. The ninth 
congress in Venice was to be little different: certainly  it  provided a forum for the expression of 
occasional if generally  veiled anti-Austrian sentiment, but Ginsborg’s assertion that a ‘climate of 
suppressed, and sometimes unsuppressed, nationalism permeated the whole congress’ (Ginsborg, 
1979, 68) seems an exaggeration. As with earlier congresses, the ninth, rather than simply  pitching 
nationalist feelings against Austrian oppression, permitted a wide variety of delegates of very 
different political goals and allegiances to negotiate the sometimes conflicting but often 
complementary  appeals of the municipal, the local, the regional, the national, the imperial, the 
European, and the global. Maria Laura Soppelsa has rightly observed, ‘i due congressi veneti 
[Padua and Venice] non rappresentano solo luoghi altamente evocativi e portatori di valori e simboli 
pregni di significato’ but  also ‘due importanti osservatori “speculativi” per un duplice ordine di 
motivazioni, e nazionali e regionali’ (Soppelsa, 2001, 234), but they were also seen as a chance to 
position Venetian scholarship within broader transnational debates without challenging the region’s 
political status as part of the Austrian Empire, even if some delegates profited from the opportunity 
to take a swipe at Austrian rule.
 It is within the context of the ninth congress that we wish to examine the opening of the so-
called Panteon veneto under the auspices of the Istituto Veneto di Scienze, Lettere ed Arti. The 
pantheon was intended to celebrate ‘uomini insigni nella politica, nelle armi, nella navigazione, 
nelle scienze, nelle lettere e nelle arti nati a Venezia o nei suoi dintorni dai tempi antichi fino al 
secolo XVII’ (AIVSLA, b.1: Panteon Veneto, 1847). Originally instituted under the Napoleonic 
Regno Italico, during the reign of Ferdinand the Istituto Veneto was treated especially munificently 
by the Habsburg authorities. This generous treatment included the grant of a magnificent space in 
the Palazzo Ducale (Gullino, 1996). 
 In the absence of a university  in Venice, it was to the Istituto that the task of running the 
ninth congress was entrusted, and the Istituto’s members saw the congress as an opportunity to erect 
a more lasting symbol to the great men of the city and its hinterland. There was, of course, nothing 
new about the idea of a pantheon. The members of the Istituto Veneto were certainly aware of much 
earlier examples both within and outside Italy’s frontiers (Parker, 2011, 112–15), but there was 
much recent precedent  as well. The publication of Francesco Regli’s I compagni del Walkalla [sic] 
descritti dal Re Ludovico I di Baviera fondatore del Walkalla [sic] (Milan: Guglielmini, 1847) 
meant that members of the Istituto knew of the bombastic and nationalist enterprise of the King of 
Bavaria, a vast  neo-classical monument to the great and good of the German nation. There were 
Italian models too. Not least because of Canova’s prominent rôle in the project, educated Venetians 
were aware of the ‘magnifica italiana raccolta di busti’ (known as the Protomoteca Capitolina, it 
included Dante and Michelangelo, Titian, Veronese, Ariosto, Brunelleschi, and Goldoni) assembled 
by Pius VII in the Palazzo dei Conservatori in Rome (Rampoldi, 1834, 493). Many of those 
involved in organising the ninth congress had presumably read about or actually seen the statues of 
famous historical figures in the Palazzo Brera during the Milan congress of 1844. These in turn had 
probably  been inspired by the statues of uomini illustri placed in the portioes of the Uffizi in 
Florence in 1843 (Martinelli & Pietrangeli, 1955; Barsottini, 1856; Parker, 2011, 112–14). Nearer to 
home, the Prato della Valle in Padua, where statues to great men were first erected from 1775, also 
probably  acted as an inspiration (Capellini, 2001), as did Francesco Hayez’s frescoes for the 
Parnaso Veneto painted in the Palazzo Gritti in 1818 (Pavanello, 1992).
 The statues of the Uffizi and Hayez’s paintings in the Gritti unashamedly stressed the local 
at the expense of the national. The same priorities were evident in an independent plan announced 
by the Venetian sculptor, Francesco Bosa, first  publicised in the Austrian-sponsored mouthpiece, the 
Gazzetta privilegiata on 19 January  1847. Bosa wished to commemorate a dozen famous Venetians: 
Andrea Navagero (humanist poet, diplomat, botanist), Carlo Goldoni, Lorenzo Giustiniani 
(patriarch and saint), Paolo Sarpi, Enrico Dandolo (blind doge behind the fourth crusade), Vettor 
Pisani (fourteenth-century admiral, victorious against the Genoese), Carlo Zeno (ditto), Francesco 
Morosini (seventeenth-century military commander in the wars against the Turks, subsequently 
elected Doge), Marco Polo, Giovanni Bellini, Pietro Bembo, and Marcantonio Bragadin (the 
Venetian military commander, flayed alive by the Turks after the capture of Cyprus). Bosa’s work 
was curious for its omissions (Bellini was the only artist; Dandolo and Morosini were the only 
doges), and characterised by the high proportion of military figures. It was a martial Venice, as well 
as one of art, literature, exploration, and religion that he wanted to celebrate, and which was noted 
with pleasure by the Austrian-controlled press. If the Serenissima’s past could be exploited for the 
glory of the modern city, so equally the city’s heroism, imperial expansion, artistic brilliance of 
long-dead inhabitants could be appropriated for the greater glory of the Habsburg imperial project. 
 The Istituto’s pantheon – also announced in January 1847 – would eclipse Bosa’s project, 
despite the latter’s insistence that his original idea had been stolen. (Bosa to Istituto Veneto, 27 
April 1847. AIVSLA, b.1: Panteon Veneto, 1847). The first  fifteen busts and two plaques erected 
under the auspices of the Istituto Veneto, were located just off the Scala dei giganti in the Palazzo 
Ducale, and commemorated several of the figures chosen by Bosa: Pietro Bembo, Carlo Goldoni, 
Enrico Dandolo, Paolo Sarpi, Francesco Morosini. The majority were not on Bosa’s list. Military 
men did not figure prominently. Most were men of letters (Goldoni and Bembo, Paolo Paruta, and 
Doge Marco Foscarini, Gaspare Gozzi and Apostolo Zeno, and the composer and writer Bendetto 
Marcello) or in the field of science and engineering (Galileo Galilei, Giovanni Poleni, the hydraulic 
engineer Bernardino Zendrini, the geologist Giovanni Arduino, and the polymath Lazzaro Moro). In 
this city of painters no one saw fit to honour Titian or Bellini, and while Canova was included 
alongside the architect  Vincenzo Scamozzi, Palladio was not. This slightly curious selection is 
explained by  the fact that, while the Istituto paid for the memorials to Bembo and Poleni, and the 
Congress delegates honoured Galileo, it  was generally individuals who commissioned the 
commemorative busts. Personal taste and family  connections shaped their choices. It was Giuseppe 
Camploy – impressario at  the Teatro San Samuele, and dealer in pianos and sheet music (Rosselli, 
1985, 250) – who paid for the bust  of Benedetto Marcello, the only  composer selected. Why he 
should have chosen Marcello over Monteverdi or Vivaldi is unclear. Even Canova’s bust  – a self-
portrait – was donated by his half brother. 
 Venetians chose which figures to commemorate, but their choices had to be sanctioned by 
the Austrians. Significantly when a group of former patricians commissioned a bust of Enrico 
Dandolo, the authorities had no qualms about its incorporation. While Napoleon had carried off the 
quadriga in triumph from the front of the Basilica, Francis I had returned the four bronze horses to 
their ‘rightful’ place (Pilot, 1914, 226); now the great mediæval Doge who had stolen them from 
Constantinople was triumphantly acknowledged. Such memorialisation of republican imperialism 
might have proved problematic: after all, it took place in a building that was once the seat of 
Venetian imperial government, now used both to house both the Istituto Veneto and the Biblioteca 
Marciana – the cultural repository of Venetian learning – and as the centre of Austrian 
administration. Yet the Habsburgs welcomed this celebration of Venice’s republican, oligarchic, 
imperial (Parker, 2011, 116–27).3
 The ninth Congress of Italian Scientists – as well as the parallel publication of the famous 
Venezia e le sue lagune – has traditionally been seen as a moment when Venice’s greatness – ‘la 
grandezza della città nostra’ (Correr, 1847, I, ii) – was stitched into the fabric of a growing 
nationalist sentiment, soon to find voice in the 1848 insurrection. But it should equally be seen as 
one of several moments when the Austrians thought that  they could appropriate a shared Italian 
culture and the past of world’s most  enduring republic to strengthen their own imperial project. 
Surprisingly this experiment did not cease with the revolution. Despite the reaction that followed 
the siege of Venice (Zorzi, 1985, 105–11; Laven, 2011, 56–7; Del Negro, 2002, 167–73), a more 
accommodating approach was soon adopted (Laven, 2011, 57–8), which extended to engagement 
with Venice’s past. On 23 March 1853 the Gazzetta privilegiata announced official approval of the 
plans of the Istituto Veneto, now under the direction of the historian Augostino Sagredo, to expand 
the Panteon. Seven new busts were inaugurated in 1858: the commemoration of Giovanni Bellini 
and Titian was doubtless overdue, but lobbying also saw the inclusion of some relatively obscure 
figures (two of the memorials were paid for by  direct descendants of the male line): the surgeon 
Francesco Pajola, the orientalist, Giambattista Galliccioli, and the translator of Ossian, linguist, and 
collaborator with the French, Melchiorre Cesarotti. If the last was a surprise, it also underlined the 
Habsburg spirit of tolerance. More interesting was the fact that  Carlo Zeno and Vettor Pisani, 
fourteenth-century admirals in the wars against the Genoese, were memorialised: clearly martial 
glory could be accommodated notwithstanding the Venetians’ recent and stubborn resistance. 
Significantly, this took place at a time when, in response to 1849–9, Venetians were excluded from 
serving in the Habsburg fleet  (Sondhaus, 1989). More surprisingly  still, in 1863, a bust of Angelo 
Emo – Venice’s last great naval hero – was erected at the expense of the municipio. Indeed, the 
celebration of the late Venetian Republic – often seen as the ‘victim’ of the Austrian expansion – 
might be considered especially  strange. In 1859 a bust was erected to Paolo Renier, Venice’s 
penultimate Doge. The choice of Renier – scarcely one of the most heroic or famous of doges – was 
probably  because his sculpture was paid for by his grandson Matteo Persico. Nevertheless, the 
inclusion of Renier and Emo shows the relaxed nature of the Habsburg authorities towards Venice’s 
past grandeur. This readiness to annex Venice’s past – to try render it an unproblematic municipal 
lieu de mémoire – is underlined by the way in which two busts were erected in the Panteon in 1860, 
paid for by the Emperor’s brother Maximilian, viceroy of Lombardy-Venetia from 1857 to 1859. 
The bust of Tintoretto was unproblematic, almost inevitable given the inclusion of Titian and 
Bellini. But the inclusion of the sixteenth-century  Doge Andrea Gritti – who as provveditore 
generale had organised courageous resistance to Emperor Maximilian I, and who had successfully 
reacquired much of the territory lost  by  Venice after the battle of Agnadello – spoke of a resurgent 
Venice recovering from imperial aggression. Gitti’s was a story  told with vigour in volume 5 of 
Romanin’s (Romanin, 218–39, 263–8, 317), which had appeared in 1856. Even if one ignored Gritti 
as a strategist, he remained a powerful symbol of Venetian individuality, determination, and 
resistance (Magani, 1997, 209).
 The spate of commissions from the municipio for busts inaugurated between 1861 and 1865 
is also significant (Parker, 2011, 136–59; Bonannina, 1995 & 1996). Looking at the list of names, 
3 It is noteworthy that the Scala dei Giganti and the statues of Mars and Neptune at its top, realised respectively by 
Antonio Rizzo and Jacopo Sansovino were not only designed as a symbol of the power and the authority of the doge, 
but also to emphasise Venice’s domination of both the stato da mar and the Terraferma (Goy, 2006, 224; Fortini Brown,
1996, 164).
questions begin to arise: Did Doge Angelo Partecipazio’s resistance to Pepin’s attack on Venice in 
the early ninth century  have a special resonance after 1849? Was the bust  of Andrea Contarini – 
fourteenth-century hero of the wars against Genoa – to highlight Venice’s differences with its 
former rival or to stress the fighting qualities of Venetians? Was the choice of Leonardo Loredan, 
who had so successfully  weathered the League of Cambrai, a statement of Venice’s independence of 
spirit? Was the inclusion in 1865 of Dante, whose connection with Venice was tenuous, a means of 
highlighting Venice’s italianità as the new Kingdom sought to aquire the region? Some of the 
privately  funded busts and plaques were also potentially problematic: if the memory of Marco Polo 
or Aldus Manutius was uncontroversial, other choices could be seen as political threats. For 
example, in 1866, on the eve of annexation, Vincenzo Paolo Barzizza’s two commissions were 
placed in the Panteon. The aim was clearly to celebrate Barzizza’s own forefathers, as the two busts 
erected honoured Gasparino Barzizza, the Bergamasco humanist, and, from the maternal line, Paolo 
Erizzo, a fifteenth-century admiral. But did the choice of another heroic naval commander 
emphasise Venice’s connection with empire, war, and the sea? Potentially  even more provocative 
was the commission from Faustino Persico (married into the Renier family, and a longstanding 
imperial Chamberlain, but also a friend of the anti-Austrian novelist Ippolito Nievo) of a bust of 
Ugo Foscolo, whose rejection of the Biblioteca italiana alone might have been considered sufficient 
to exclude him. 
 But there is another way of reading the celebration of heroic Venetians, and even the claims 
to italianità implicit  in the erection of busts of Dante and Foscolo, or even those of Bembo or Aldus 
Manutius. Members of the Istituto were making patriotic gestures – with the patria here being 
Venice and Italy – but the Austrians were happy for this to take place. They  understood that there 
was no point  in ‘Germanising’ the region. If Francis Joseph conceived of himself very much as ‘ein 
deutscher Fürst’, he was also an Austrian Emperor fully aware of the cultural diversity  of his 
territories. There was no point trying to suppress those cultures. It was much more effective to 
appropriate them: the celebration of Venetian heroes, even Venetian heroes who had fought against 
Habsburg rulers, was a much more effective way of attaching Venice to the ruling house and its 
imperial mission than any denial of past victories and grandeur, especially  given the fact that a 
burgeoning historiography, Italian and non-Italian, was opening Venice’s past to a growing 
readership across Europe and North America. Appropriation was a way of sanatising or neutralising 
the past: Austrian sanction reduced any patriotic threat. 
Conclusion
In 1866 Venice and its mainland were lost  to Austria, a product of Prussian victory rather than 
Italian military prowess or a Venetian struggle for independence: ‘foreign rule’ had come to an end. 
Venetians welcomed their newfound ‘liberation’, but without great enthusiasm: any relief was 
rapidly diluted by a disillusionment and indifference. Venetians showed little rancour towards the 
withdrawing Austrian officials and soldiers. Less than a decade later, on 5 April 1875, huge crowds 
turned out to greet Francis Joseph when he visited the city; significantly the trip took place scarcely 
a fortnight  after the inauguration of a monument to Daniele Manin.4 One reason for the absence of 
ill-will towards the Habsburgs would seem to be the readiness with which the Austrians recognised 
and cultivated Venice’s cultural and historical distinctiveness: the people of Venice were respected 
by Austria as both Italians and Venetians; there was no sense that they should not be intensely  proud 
of their heritage, their language, their customs. Attempts to foster national sentiment in the 
aftermath of unification were obliged to continue to employ the local, or, at least, a hybrid of the 
4 The significance was not lost to contemporaries. See, for example, the remarks in John Webb Probyn, Italy from the 
fall of Napoleon (1884, 347–8)
local and national. Venetians continued to negotiate their identity within a centralising state, through 
loyalty to the municipal, positioning their own past within a wider Italian and European narrative. 
This was certainly not unique to Venice – as Axel Körner has pointed out municipal identity could 
become ‘the key to engaging with the nation’ (2009, 5) – but, to the extent that nationalism took 
hold in the city, it  was essentially  dependent on accommodating that sense of the local that had 
always been acknowledged and fostered by the authorities in Vienna.
